ABSTRACT The rapid spread of micropayment systems, together with some peculiarity of their typical use, have attracted computer criminals and dishonest companies aiming at exploiting the systems' weaknesses to steal from users both personal data and money. This paper considers and analyzes some security risks associated with a particular form of micropayment, operator centric micropayment (OCM). A new technique of attack, aimed at an OCM system used by millions of users and named mobile session fixation, is described. By its use, a criminal can obtain the payer's phone number and even arrange the theft of some money. The paper proposes possible countermeasures and further hints for potential threats which might be the subject of analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Micropayment systems offer the end user the chance to purchase through a mobile device a great variety of very low-value online services (news, apps, games, photos, movies etc.) for a small amount of money [1] . Their appearance dates back to around 1994 [2] and their use grew continuously since then, thanks to the success of the Internet and to the following spread of mobility [3] - [5] . One of the most common form of micropayment for mobile devices is known as Operator Centric Micropayment (OCM) [6] and is usually provided by a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) or by a consortium of MNOs. OCM allows to charge the expenses to the traffic credit the user has purchased from the MNO (pre-paid billing) or to the user's account when the user has an active subscription for the MNO services (direct carrier or post-paid billing) [7] . While other long-established mobile payment methods (e.g. credit cards) may be too complex, not fully trusted or not available, easiness and transparency of OCMs are almost unbeatable and have the power to substantially expand the catchment area. As a result, the number of OCM platforms is rapidly increasing (Bango [8] , Fortuno [9] , Mobiyo [10] , NTH Mobile [11] , to name just a few) thus allowing a growing number of users to easily access mobile payment service and conspicuously raising the interest for the economy of this sector [7] , [12] .
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On the other hand, the great number of potential users, coupled with the simplicity of the payment method and with the low chance that a user might perceive a small undesired withdrawal from his/her credit, makes this form of payment an extremely interesting target for thieves (either of money and/or identities). At the same time the security of such platforms has been severely questioned [13] , [14] .
In such a scenario the challenge of designing secure micropayment systems becomes a priority [15] . The term ''secure'' is used here to mean they must guarantee the security of the transactions and the protection of the privacy of digital services customers [12] . This paper analyzes the security risks involved in a large OCM system serving more than 100 millions mobile subscriptions in Italy [16] , and discloses a previously unknown technique of attack to exploit a security hole discovered in the system. It also suggests possible defenses against such attack and hints at further potential threats which might be the subject of analysis.
Section II presents the legal elements defining an OCM system and its operation. Section III shows what makes an OCM system an interesting target for computer criminals and dishonest companies. Section IV defines a typical OCM platform from a functional point of view. Section V proposes and details a new attack technique, dubbed Mobile Session Fixation (MSF). Section VI details the application of MSF to a real case of 0day [17] vulnerability. Section VII describes the conceptual design error underlying the vulnerability, and discusses its consequences. Section VIII proposes a number of countermeasures against the MSF attack and details the steps to put one of them into effect. Section IX draws conclusions. Section X sketches a road map for future researches.
II. MICROPAYMENT SYSTEMS
Definitions of a micropayment system are mainly based on the magnitude of the sums involved in the transactions. For PayPal, a micropayment system is one allowing payments lower than £5 [18] . For Visa the threshold is 20 AU hboxtextdollar [19] . This paper accepts the definition given by the Italian Ministerial Decree [20] . Such ruling states a limit of e12.50 (VAT excluded) for the purchase of a single digital item. In the micropayment systems taken into account in this paper, each user holding a telephone number provided by a consortium of MNOs, owns an online mobile account which is accessible by the micropayments platform set up by the MNOs. For each purchase such account is debited the cost of the transaction, thus removing the need for the seller to resort to a banking system for the credit collection.
III. WHAT MAKES MICROPAYMENT SYSTEMS AN INTERESTING TARGET FOR CRIMINALS
Two facts make micropayment systems an obvious target for criminals: a) the huge number of potential targets (recently the worldwide number of smartphone users has surpassed that of computer users [21] ) and b) the easiness of payments. Both factors combine in offering an immense base for criminal attempts, making possible even for the least astute fraud to harvest a respectable amount of money. However other elements concur to raise the attractiveness of micropayment systems:
A. LACK OF MICROPAYMENTS SECURITY STANDARDS
It is worth noting that as of today no universally recognized security standard exists about the design, the operations, the use of micropayment systems. That puts them definitely apart from other comparable payment systems. As an example the PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) [22] can be mentioned. PCI DSS is a set of procedures and policies aimed at optimizing the security of credit, debit and payment cards transactions, enforced to guarantee data security. All companies accepting or processing cards and related data are required to comply with PCI DSS. Also, PCI Mobile (PCI Mobile Payment Acceptance Security Guidelines) [23] guidelines aimed at guaranteeing secure payments by mobile devices have been issued. The lack of international regulations and standards for micropayment systems and the elimination of the traditional mediation role played by banks [24] may act as an incentive for dishonest companies and computer criminals.
B. END-USERS SECURITY
The end users of a micropayment system are the weak link of the security chain [25] . First of all, their potentially great number must be considered: a study [26] reported the results of a poll where 40% of the interviewed phone users pointed to the phone credit as their preferred way of paying for services or content to be used by a mobile device. Paypal came second (25%) while debit and credit cards were preferred only by 15% of the sample. Assuming such preferred choice is more likely to come from less tech-savvy users, an indirect consequence of such numerousness is that a considerable number of users is not in the position to manage incidents or swindles or, more simply, to detect their occurrence. And even when an user becomes aware of any such problem, the very small amount of money involved and the effort needed to denounce and prove the swindle, induce the user to underrate the incident and to avoid reporting it. All this is extremely attractive for computer criminals as they can steal identities and a large number of small sums without risking too much.
C. ATTACK SURFACE EXTENSION
Since their inception, mobile devices have offered a few functionalities not commonly available in desktop and notebook computers. The set of such almost exclusive functionalities grew remarkably with smartphones and continues to grow at a rapid pace. In turn, this increases the appeal of such systems for criminals, who get more and more new fields and opportunities to explore in their effort to be a step ahead of the security measures.
IV. MICROPAYMENT IN ITALY
The operation and the services of a typical OCM platform, the one created in Italy by a consortium including the six larger italian MNOs [27] , will now be described. To benefit from the services of the platform, the users need a data SIM card and a phone number belonging to one of the six MNOs. The cost of the purchased goods and services are directly subtracted from the SIM card credit (for pay-as-you-go subscriptions) or charged on the users' account (for subscription plans).
Two types of users are allowed to interact with the platform:
• Partners: those enabled to sell services and contents to all MNOs customers through the OCM platform;
• Customers: the end users enabled to purchase services and contents (e.g. news, movies, live events, music, games etc.) from Partners. The OCM platform allows for two access methods to access and purchase digital services offered by Partners:
• Mobile Number Confirmation: the first method is based on user authentication and purchase confirmation through the user's phone number (when the OCM platform recognizes it as belonging to one of the consorted MNOs).
• Mobile Number and PIN Insertion: the second method is based on user authentication through the manual insertion of the phone number in an online form field and the following reception of a confirmation code sent by SMS to that number from the operator. After the received code VOLUME 7, 2019 is inserted in another field, user identity is confirmed and the purchase may be finalized. By the same methods the user is allowed to access an online portal where the list of past purchases may be inspected or downloaded.
The intended operation of the platform is easily described. A user visits a web page and clicks a link to purchase a digital service set up and advertised on a 3 rd party (Partner) server. The 3 rd party server sends the micropayment platform the TCP/IP data of the user (supposedly associated to a mobile device). The micropayment platform retrieves the phone number associated to those TCP/IP data (provided the user has an account with one of the MNOs supported by the platform). The platform creates and sends the 3 rd party server a Transaction ID (TR-ID from now on) associated with the particular transaction in progress. The 3 rd party server builds an URL containing the TR-ID and redirects the user to that URL. Following this step, the transaction is managed by the 3 rd party server who eventually communicates its conclusion to the micropayment platform. In turn, the latter will charge the involved sum to the user account.
Among the reasons motivating the present technical investigation about micropayment systems in Italy were the widespread reports about italian users who found themselves paying a monthly fee for low-value digital services they never intentionally subscribed to. Such reports are usually sent to MNOs and Consumer associations and get a large circulation through social networks. Comprehensive reports about the phenomenon have been published [28] . However they are not exhaustive and they do not cover the security hole described in the present paper.
V. MOBILE SESSION FIXATION ATTACK
After a careful analysis of how OCM systems operate, a new attack technique has been discovered. It was named Mobile Session Fixation, as it is a variation of a known technique, mostly used in a Web environment, called Session Fixation [29] - [34] . Just as for Session Fixation, MSF exploits flawed authentication [35] and session management [36] , which allow attackers to compromise passwords, keys, session tokens, or to impersonate other user identities. In essence, the de facto standard session management mechanism is imperfect, which is why session management vulnerabilities rank second in the OWASP top 10 of web application vulnerabilities [37] .
Here the victim is the Customer of the OCM platform described in section IV, who owns a SIM card and its related phone number.
By MSF, an attacker may exploit the victim's session ID to get hold of personal and sensitive data such as the user's name, the phone number and the mobile wallet access credentials.
In figure 1 a simple scenario describing the attack is sketched. In the present case the attack aims at the first of the two access method described in section 4 (Mobile Number Confirmation). Following is the list of the parties in play:
• The attacker: an offender (a computer criminal), aiming at violating victims' privacy, getting their personal data in order to commit a fraud.
• The 3 rd party web Server or Partner: a web application (set-up by an OCM platform Partner company) aimed at selling services or digital contents by the payment method provided by the OCM platform.
• The OCM platform: the online platform mentioned in section IV, designed to provide micropayment services. The platform allows third-parties (The 3 rd party web Server or Partner) to sell their services and digital contents to all consorted MNOs Customers.
• The Victim: a user possessing a mobile device (smartphones, tablets and more), with an active SIM and a mobile data connection (2G, 3G, etc.) provided by one of the consorted MNOs. The steps of the Mobile Session Fixation attack will now be detailed:
1 The attacker (through a NON-mobile internet connection) accesses a Partner's Web application selling services or digital contents. In other words the attacker opens a perfectly lawful HTTP dialogue with the 3 rd party web server.
2 Once the 3 rd party web server receives the attacker's connection request, it asks the OCM platform a session ID (the TR-ID). Such ID is an essential part of the mechanism implemented by the OCM platform to allow the users to purchase goods and services by their mobile phone credit.
3 The OCM platform generates the TR-ID and answers the request by sending it back to the 3 rd party web server.
4 The 3 rd party web server answers the attacker's request by sending it the TR-ID just received from the platform. 5 The attacker is now able to create a malicious hyperlink to the OCM platform containing the TR-ID just received. He will try to lure the victim into clicking on the link. It can, for example, send it in an email message or embed it in a web page. A common and very effective way to have the victim click on the link is to propose a sequence of tempting pictures and force the victim to click on the ''next'' button to see a new picture. At a given point in the sequence, the ''next'' button is swapped in the same position with the button containing the malicious link [38] . 6 The victim (which must be connected to the Internet by a mobile data connection for the attack to be effective) clicks on the malicious hyperlink and unwittingly accesses the OCM platform. The OCM platform identifies the victim's TCP/IP data (only for addresses pools owned by the consorted MNOs) and is now able to associate it with the victim phone number and the TR-ID. The victim is now automatically and unintentionally logged on the platform.
7 At this point the attacker knows the TR-ID and is therefore able to purchase goods and services sold by the 3 rd party web server. All the purchased items would be charged on the victim's phone account. Besides, the attacker might acquire victim's personal data (e.g. the phone number), thus compromising the victim privacy and being able to commit frauds and further identity thefts.
VI. MOBILE SESSION FIXATION ATTACK: A CASE STUDY
The attack just described will now be applied to a real case. The investigations showed the OCM platform taken into account in section 4 is actually prone to receive MSF attacks. Some 0day vulnerabilities have been met and uncovered. They have been reported to the micropayment services administrators, together with the details of the used attack technique.
The basic operation of the analyzed OCM system is as follows: a platform web page is embedded in a 3 rd party Partner web page, in the form of an iframe. When the user opens the 3 rd party Partner web page, the browser also loads the OCM platform iframe. The embedded iframe has an URL built by the 3 rd party Partner after an operation it performs behind the scenes. It can only be conjectured what such operation is after carefully looking at such URL. The analysis shows there are three parameters contained in the iframe URL: 1) Size of the iframe 2) Address of the 3 rd party website 3) A session ID (TR-ID) Clearly, the platform generates a TR-ID that will be used to manage purchases and to charge the expenses on the user's mobile account. To be able to charge the user's account, the platform must try to map the user's TCP/IP data onto his/her phone number.
In figure 2 the use of the Mobile session fixation attack technique to get the victim phone number (and its associated MNO) is described. To conduct the attack we build a web application and a malicious web server emulating a 3 rd party Partner. The list of players in section V must therefore be updated by the addition of a malicious web server. It is designed to be under total attacker control and it automatizes the MSF attack by a PHP (''PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor'') code written on purpose. Following is a review of the steps to carry out the attack for a real case (the shown URLs reproduce the structure of the real ones):
1 The attacker tries to lure the victim into clicking an hyperlink http://maliciousPage.mobi. The hyperlink points to the web page containing the developed PHP code, hosted on the malicious server.
2 The victim, through a mobile device and a mobile data connection, clicks on the hyperlink sent by the attacker.
3 The malicious server (containing PHP and Javascript code) contacts the 3 rd party website to establish a lawful connection. It is important to note that the malicious server establishes the connection with the 3 rd party website through a NON mobile data connection. In this specific case the malicious server sends a simple HTTP GET request to the server hosting the 3 rd party application. (ex. HTTP GET to 3 rd party http://3partywebsite.mobi/index.ashx).
4 The 3 rd party website asks for a session ID (TR-ID) to the OCM platform. The details of such transaction are unknown to us.
5 The OCM platform generates the TR-ID. The details of such generation are also unknown to us. 6 The OCM platform answers the 3 rd party website sending an URL containing the TR-ID and an iframe parameter http://mpp.it/servicepage.jsp?TR-ID= a1b1c1&Sc=iframe (for shortness, the actual, very long, TR-ID shown in the captures is from now on substituted with a1b1c1). Since the IP address which started the process is that of the malicious server, it is not a mobile node address. Therefore it does not belong to any of the consorted MNOs and the just generated TR-ID cannot be mapped to a mobile phone number.
7 The 3 rd party server creates a web page containing an iframe and the URL http://mpp.it/servicepage. jsp?TR-ID=a1b1c1&Sc=iframe and sends it to the malicious server. of the TCP connection content, what the malicious server receives from the 3 rd party server (some data are shaded to protect the involved parties). Since the received page contains an iframe pointing to the OCM platform address, another query will start from the malicious server to that address (the transcript for such TCP connection is not shown). The source address of the capture (89.xxx.xxx.226) belongs to the 3 rd party server while the private destination address belongs to the (NATed) malicious server (though the captured page shows its pubblic address, UIP, 212.xxx.xxx.12). The picture also highlights the merchantID, that is the ID code of the 3 rd party server, and the TR-ID, i.e. the transactionID, and the hostname of the 3 rd party server.
8 At this point the malicious server does exactly what the 3 rd party server did, that is, it creates a new web page web containing the same iframe and the URL http://mpp.it/servicepage.jsp?TR-ID= a1b1c1&Sc=iframe with the same TR-ID and sends it to the victim. The iframe is hidden at this time and the victim cannot understand exactly what's going on.
9 The victim, through a mobile device and a mobile data connection, has now been, automatically and unwittingly, brought on the OCM platform. Through the described mechanism he/she will be directed to the link http://mpp.it/servicepage.jsp?TR-ID= a1b1c1&Sc=iframe. Figure 4 shows the traffic between the 3 rd party server and the victim. To allow the capture of the traffic on the mobile device, the connection has been artificially started from a computer tethered to the mobile device (the 3 rd party server sees the mobile device public address but the capture shows the tethered computer private address as the destination address). The picture highlights, within the shown connection content, the UIP (this time the device public address, 2.xxx.xxx.126), the hostname of the 3 rd party server, the merchantID and the TR-ID. It is important to note the merchantID and the TR-ID are exactly those obtained from the malicious server in the previous connection.
10 The OCM platform can now recognize the victim's IP address as belonging to the network of one of its MNOs and can therefore correctly associate the TCP/IP data with the victim's phone number and the TR-ID.
11 Without being aware, the victim generates an alert, through an AJAX embedded in the PHP code hosted by the malicious server. Thus the malicious server gets notice of the iframe download and of the successful mapping.
12 The malicious server can now perform a second iframe download by using the same TR-ID and the same URL http://micropaymentplatform.it/ser vicepage.jsp?TR-ID=a1b1c1&Sc=iframe. This time the iframe contains the victim's phone number together with the indication of the MNO it belongs to.
Finally, figure 5 shows what the Wireshark sniffer captured on the malicious server. It can be seen as now it is possible to get: the victim's mobile operator (operatorID), the victim's phone number (msisdn), the ID code of the digital good purchased from the 3 rd party (productID) and the 3 rd party seller ID (merchantID). Beyond that, the 3 rd party and the OCM Platform URLs are available for further authentications with the same TR-ID. 13 The privacy of the user is now compromised. The attacker might now continue to use the TR-ID to operate within the OCM platform or within the 3 rd party website. As an example, the attacker could be in cahoots with a dishonest OCM platform partner and share with it the money coming from unintentional purchases. Also, the knowledge of the victim's phone number could be the starting point of other frauds, blackmail and the like. 
VII. 0DAYS INTERCEPTED WITH MSF
On May 5th, 2017, after completing a number of tests, the micropayment platform vendor notified the first discovered 0day, which was based on the MSF technique here described. In the following months the vendor promptly fixed the problem, by introducing what the press defined ''the double click tool'' [40] . Nonetheless, on April 16th, 2018, a new 0day has been documented by a private recording, again based on the MSF technique. Later the vendor fixed again the vulnerability by a new protection mechanism. One more time it was possible to break this mechanism by a new 0day. We made the discovery on May 26th, 2018 and privately documented it. As of this writing (July 3rd, 2018) the 0day was not fixed, as proved by a new private recording. The code written to exploit the first 0day (May 5th, 2017), the video recordings and all the relevant files documenting the following 0days have been signed with trusted timestamps and can be provided by the authors on demand, under some restrictions, for obvious reasons. All the discovered 0days are the result of a basic design fault of the 3rd party and the OCM platform: granting a TR-ID to the IP addresses beginning a transaction, without checking beforehand for their right to get it, and authenticating the following steps in the transaction only on the base of the user's display of the very same TR-ID.
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES
First, it must be clearly stated that the responsibility for the security of the entire micropayment system rests entirely with the OCM platform and the MNOs. As a matter of fact the only effective countermeasure against such type of vulnerabilities a user can currently take is to ask his/her MNO for the total deactivation of value added services. Although surely effective, such procedure would nevertheless totally deprive the user of the freedom to access potentially useful services.
Turning from the user's to the system's point of view, a workable solution would be an overall redesign of the authentication mechanism [34] , [41] , with the adoption of multi-factor authentication methods [42] . Such a choice, however, would definitely spoil the most distinguishing feature of the micropayment systems: their being easy, swift, transparent.
A number of studies have been published in recent years about how to secure authentication mechanisms in order to mitigate session fixation attacks in the web environment [32] , [41] , [43] - [45] . The proposed methods are essentially based on:
• correctly coding web application by following OWASP best practices [46] , [47] ;
• server-side measures against Session Fixation [43] ;
• implementing a multilayered ''defence in depth'' model. All of them could be conveniently applied to mitigate MSF. Another way to mitigate MSF attacks without turning to multi-factor authentication can be based on making sure the session TR-ID can not be intercepted, predicted or guessed by brute-force. Such type of techniques have been fully described in [43] , [44] , and [47] .
In addition to those techniques, TCP/IP data and mobile phone number binding is proposed here. This means to guarantee an exclusive bidirectional bond between the user's phone number and the TCP/IP data assigned to the same user (the MNOs obviously possess all the information needed to verify such bond). In other words the MNO should deny any activity to anyone accessing the servers with an TCP/IP data it cannot associate uniquely with a phone number within the range it controls. Despite some moderate drawbacks which do not compromise the overall advantages of click-to-buy mobile micropayments (e.g. switching from a public mobile network to the home wireless LAN would break the session), such technique offers nonetheless a good trade-off between usability and security.
In the following an authentication method is proposed which would remove the vulnerability in the examined case.
1 The user accesses the 3rd party website through HTTPS. 2 The 3 rd party server sends the OCM platform the (presumably NATed) public IP address of the mobile user (UIP) together with the associated source TCP port and asks for a session ID (TR-ID), by which all following exchanges will be managed.
3 The 3 rd party server answers by generating a web page asking the user to insert a code received by an SMS.
4 At the same time the OCM platform retrieves the phone number associated with the TCP/IP data (UIP and the TCP port, both assigned by a NAT administered by one of the consorted MNO). Although the internal architecture of cellular networks is a black box for most observers, the real-time retrieval of the mobile device data based on such provided pieces of information is indeed possible, as proved by the very same existence of the security hole the present paper describes.
5 The OCM platform generates a code (ex. SMScode = 12357) and sends it to the user through an SMS (i.e. not through the Internet).
6 The user inserts the SMScode = 12357 into the web page received from the 3 rd party website. 7 The 3 rd party server forwards the SMScode = 12357 associated with the TCP/IP data to the OCM platform.
8 The OCM platform generates the TR-ID and associates it with the TCP/IP data.
9 The OCM platform communicates the TR-ID and the associated with the TCP/IP data to the 3 rd party server.
10 The 3 rd party server communicates the TR-ID to the user.
11 At this point the user is able to access all the services offered by the 3 rd party server and the OCM platform, by using the received TR-ID for each transaction. The OCM platform (and the 3 rd party server through it) will be always able to check the match between TR-ID and TCP/IP data to assure the request comes from the same user. To enhance the security of the transactions, all the messages sent through the Internet should be encrypted. Figure 6 sketches what the previous 11 points described.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper showed that, by the MSF attack technique, here described and detailed for a real case, it is possible to compromise a user's privacy. It also showed that, by leveraging MSF it is possible to perpetrate some frauds. Moreover, the inherent weaknesses of the considered micropayment system suggests in all likelihood more 0days will be discovered in the real world. It was made clear that a wrong authentication method, based in turn on wrong assumption about the services' users, is at the root of the described vulnerabilities. Based on the analysis carried out, a few possible countermeasures have been proposed.
X. FUTURE WORK
Although the security hole discovered as of this writing have been duly notified to the micropayment platform administrators, it has been possible to circumvent by new attacks each fix applied until now. All new successful attacks have been variations of the basic MSF. Actually, the lack of a trustworthy authentication procedure leaves the door open for a number of attack strategies.
Among them, a few are worth noting: a) any flaw in the tethering procedure (i.e. in the sharing of a mobile device's Internet connection with other connected computers) could offer the attacker the chance to freely visit a malicious 3rd party server and charge to the victim's account the expenses for purchased services; b) by luring the victim into clicking on a malicious link, some malware might be injected into the victim's mobile device (e.g. a piece of Javascript code). Such malware could bring the victim's device to visit a malicious 3rd party server and force the unlimited purchase of services, charging the expenses to the unaware victim's account.
Future work will firstly focus on documenting new successfully tried attacks and on evaluating the chances of other exploits of the described vulnerability. Also the security of new fixes will be monitored.
Secondly, new scenarios arising when one of the proposed defense techniques is adopted will be studied, namely how the suggested strict association between TCP/IP data and phone number relates to the handover between different types of connection of mobile devices to the Internet (e.g. cellular, WiFi) and how such factor affects the access to the micropayment platform.
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